WHO ARE THE PAYMASTERS?

A number of powerful political, ideological and economic interests are at play in the current migration policy, which is mainly focused on the fight against irregular migration, border security, outsourcing of migration control and returns. In this dense web of often conflicting interests, a Migration Control Industry (MCI) is steadily growing and establishing itself as an influential player. Its main advocates are the security and arms industry, but also other economic actors and secondary services that indirectly benefit from this policy. This is the case, for example, of technology industries, construction companies, airlines and other transport companies providing for the voluntary or forced return of irregular migrants, private security, utilities or logistics companies in charge of reception centres and a whole array of businesses providing social or educational services focused on integration.

This policy of migration containment and border reinforcement also benefits the black market or illegal economy, for example through cheap underground labour, as well as the organised crime through migrant smuggling groups and trafficking networks, both inside (secondary movements) and outside the EU borders. The greater the risks incurred by migrants, the greater the benefits for the trafficking mafias. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), despite the COVID-19 confinement measures, border closures and restrictions, the smuggling of migrants continues and may increase. Smugglers charge higher tariffs given the more risky routes and conditions. Moreover, the future global economic crisis is likely to increase cross-border trafficking as migrants are compelled to flee higher unemployment and serious scarcity.

Unauthorized migrants (including those asylum seekers whose cases are pending resolution) were only 1% of the total population of Europe in 2017. In the case of Spain, at the end of 2019, irregular migrants numbered between 390,000 and 470,000, that is, between 11% and 13% of the total non-EU immigrants and around 0.8% of the total population residing in Spain. Only 9% of Spanish irregular immigrants come from Africa. Based on these figures, what interests lie behind the concentration of financial and political resources on the Southern border? The initial Commission’s proposal (2018) for the next...
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\(^1\) “The Migration Control Industry The Spanish winners of European Union border policies”: Fundación porCausa report Oct 2017 Ex. Summary
https://www.porcausa.org/industriascontrolmigratorio/media/porCausaAnalysis_ExecutiveSummary.pdf

\(^2\) How COVID-19 restrictions and the economic consequences are likely to impact migrant smuggling and cross-border trafficking in persons to Europe and North America

\(^3\) Pew Research Center

En España: https://verne.elpais.com/verne/2018/07/30/articulo/1532946223_844070.html
2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF)\(^4\), aimed at "reinforcing the role of the European Union as a security and defence provider". For this purpose, at least, €30.8 billion will be allocated to migration and border control (2.7% of the total budget and 207% more than the previous period), € 24.3 billion will go to security and defence (2.1% of the total) as well as a large part of the €100 billion for innovation and the digital economy. The former EU Vice President Jyrki Katainen, said it was “the first time in the history of the EU, that a part of the European budget is devoted to investing collectively to develop new technologies and equipment to protect our people.” He referred to the new European Defence Fund, which will boost “cross-border investments in state-of-the-art and fully interoperable technology and equipment in areas such as encrypted software and drone technology”\(^5\).

At the European level, this study will describe (A) what policies and funds are aimed at migration control beyond the EU borders in what is called externalization/outourcing; (B) which are aligned to shield external borders; and (C) who is managing migration inside the EU, both irregular and regular.

At the national level, Spain is responsible for administering not only EU funds transferred for migration management (801.6 million euros since 2015\(^6\)), but also direct its own financing through the national budget. National funds for border control are run by the Ministry of Interior and the new Ministry for Social Security, Inclusion and Migration. Although migration control is an exclusive central government competence, Spain as a decentralized state, shares and delegates with regional (Autonomous Communities) and local entities some powers related to migration (social and inclusion affairs, unaccompanied minors, etc.).

Having a southern EU external border on its territory, Spain is a key strategic actor in migration, which in the last thirty years\(^7\) has turned into transit and destination country for migration. Given the maritime routes (both through the Canary Islands and the Mediterranean) and having the only external land border of the EU with Africa, through the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla\(^8\), in North Africa, Spain receives and manages considerable amounts of funds, logistical means and security systems. This has become El Dorado for the ICM.

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\(^4\) 2018 Commission’s proposal for 2021-2027 MFF
EP Analysis
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/studies/IDAN/2016/625148/EN.PDF
\(^5\) These figures from the 2018 Commission proposal are currently under interinstitutional negotiation and will probably be reduced under the new pandemic crisis scenario.
\(^6\) Commission DG HOME factsheet on EU Financial Support to Spain (Feb 2020)
\(^7\) Report (only in Spanish) Fundación porCausa y Andalucía Acoge: Recorrido Migratorio: 30 años de muertes en el Estrecho:
\(^8\) PorCausa report: Melilla y la excepcionalidad fronteriza
1. EUROPEAN FUNDING AT THE SERVICE OF MIGRATION CONTROL

1.1. Border externalization policies

There is a clear effort to support and reinforce the external dimension of migration containment and border protection policies. During the period 2015-2018, 57% (€12,500 million) of the total funding to respond to unexpected arrival of refugees in 2015/2016 was assigned to actions outside of the EU, while 43% has been assigned to the internal dimension. The 2020 Commission Work Programme\(^9\) announces a new Pact on Migration and Asylum as the successor of the European Agenda on Migration of 2015. The new document will take whole-of-route approach, “acknowledging that the internal and external aspects of migration are inextricably linked”. Today, this link is divided between a slight internal agenda (regular and irregular migration, including secondary movements)\(^10\) versus a consolidated but disperse externalization policy that subcontracts migration control to third countries. In the Priorities for a Stronger Europe in the World, the new Von der Leyen Commission puts together several fields of actions in which, directly or indirectly, migration control would be present. Those fields are external policy, neighbourhood and enlargement policies, international cooperation and development, humanitarian aid and civilian protection, security and defence and, indirectly, trade.

1.1.1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Service for Foreign Policy Instrument (DG FPI) in collaboration with the European External Action Service (EEAS), are responsible for European external affairs. Josep Borrell, as High Representative and Vice-President coordinates UE external action, and the external dimension of other policies in the frame of the Commissioners’ Group on a Stronger Europe in the World. Its portfolio includes bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations, CFSP coordination and missions, coordination of EU special representatives, among others.

The CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are carrying out missions that are implementing border and migration control even if this is not part of its original legal mandate. Currently, 10 civilian missions

\(^9\) Commission Work Programme 2020
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar%3A7ae642ea-4340-11ea-b81b-01aa75ed71a1.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

\(^10\) Secondary movements: movement of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who for different reasons move from the country in which they first arrived to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere. This movement is without the prior consent of the national authorities, without an entry visa, or with no or insufficient documentation normally required for travel purposes, or with false or fraudulent documentation. See article (only in Spanish): Movimientos secundarios: la Patera invisible: https://www.esglobal.org/movimientos-secundarios-la-patera-invisible/
are rolling out in 10 countries and military mission in the Balkans, Southern Mediterranean, Central African Republic, The Gulf of Aden, Somalia and Mali. In line with the integrated foreign and security policy, the EU has promoted new initiatives to “train and equip” security forces of third countries (including the army, police, border patrol and rule of law). The traces of migration control can be detected especially in the Sahel region (EuCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali in Mali or EUCAP Sahel Niger in Niger) and in Libya (with the EU Border Assistance Mission-EUBAM), which some call the advanced border. An example of CSDP missions born from the 2015 crisis is the military operation “Sophia”, created to alleviate pressure from the Italian Coast Guard and to fight migrant trafficking networks. Sophia was actively involved in sea-rescue, for what was very controversial at the time. In 2018, its sea-rescue operations were suspended and since 2019, it is only officially limited to air surveillance.

1.1.2. Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Policy

The externalization of migration control, meaning that migration containment is outsourced to origin and transit migration countries, has clearly shaped the bilateral and regional relations in the area of development cooperation. The efforts to avoid displacement in countries of origin through the development of opportunities, improvement of economic perspectives, and direct investments, have aligned the priorities and the scope of this policy to integrate the migration control in bilateral relations with transit and origin third countries. This process was institutionalised during the Valletta Summit in 2015. The main financial instruments to integrate migration control in development cooperation are:

- **Emergency Trust Funds**¹¹: Madad Fund (EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis) and EUTF-Africa Fund¹² an emergency trust fund for stability and addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration to contribute to better migration management) in the regions of the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa.

According to Oxfam¹³, 22% of the projects approved under the EUTF-Africa have been assigned to migration management (mainly in transit countries), 13.5% to security and peace consolidation (mostly focused on transit countries), 63% to development cooperation (implemented mainly in countries of origin) and the remaining 1.5% to research and monitoring.

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¹¹ More on EU Trust Funds: [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/trust-funds_en](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/trust-funds_en)

¹² Resources currently allocated to the EU Trust Fund for Africa: [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en)

Migration Control Industry 1: Who are the paymasters?

Humanitarian Aid Operations

Under the Commissioner for Crisis Management, the Slovenian Janez Lenarčič, these operations cover natural disasters and forced displacement, which includes refugees, asylum-seekers and Internally Displaced Persons. During the period 2014-2020, €7,100 million have been allocated to these operations, and for the next 2021-2027 MFF, the Commission proposal plans €11,000 million. The EU is the world's main donor of humanitarian aid.

1.1.3. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations

The European neighbourhood is one of the most evident settings of the externalization of migration control. The European Union signed and developed projects of bilateral, regional and transnational cooperation in the Southern neighbourhood, which includes the Maghreb region (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). Although, this policy covers activities funded by EUTF-Africa or Madad Fund, the majority of the funding comes from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). Over 2014-2020 period, the EU has allocated through ENI between €7,5 and €9,2 billion (from a total of €15,4 billion). ENI priorities are economic development, security and migration. Only in Morocco, the main beneficiary of EU development aid, the Commission also planned €1.400 millions through the ENI for this period. Even though, according to the European Court of Auditors, EU financial aid to the Morocco “provided limited added value and ability to support reforms in the country”.

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) is an example of the synergies between migration and development policies. Created by Frontex and funded by DG DEVCO, AFIC cooperates with countries of origin and transit in the areas of security, irregular migration, human trafficking, falsification of documents and human trafficking routes. DG DEVCO funds training activities and risk analysis cells in Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea and Mali. These cells are directed by local analysts trained by Frontex to collect and analyse strategic data on cross-border crime in different African countries and to assist the relevant authorities involved in border management. In this way, Frontex operates way beyond the external borders, signing cooperation agreements and deploying staff and resources in countries of origin and transit, offering more favourable commercial relations or development assistance subjected to the collaboration with the containment of migratory flows and returns (see Annex 2 on Frontex).

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16 In November 2019, Casa Africa, Canary Islands, hosted the second plenary meeting of AFIC (link available only in Spanish): http://www.casafrica.es/detalles-notas-prensa.jsp?DSS1.PROID=914580
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17 EU Southern neighbourhood: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/southern-neighbourhood_en
18 The EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis (Madad Fund) has reached almost 1 400 millions of euro in mixed funding from the EU and its Member States: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/content/home_en
19 An example of the projects of the European Neighbourhood policy is the EUTBoderSecurity (2019-2021), which aims at bettering border security through the enhancement of bilateral and regional cooperation among countries at the Southern border and Frontex.
20 In 2014, Morocco adopted the National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA) to guaranty better management of migratory flows while respecting human rights and facilitating the integration of regular migrants. Four years later, in 2018, not only it was not working, but the authorities launched a vast repression campaign against thousands of Sub-Saharan African migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, especially in the north of the country. Thousands of them, including children and pregnant women, were illegally arrested and abandoned in the south of the country, in isolated areas at the Algeria border.

1.2. Policies that strengthen Fortress Europe

It is regarding securitization and militarization of EU external borders where the interest of the security and defence industry is most evident. Security challenges in today’s volatile context, with rapid, complex and cross-border threats underpin the powerful concept of Fortress Europe, where shielding borders is a key guarantee for protecting a Schengen area without internal borders. To do this, the EU is focused on giving continuity to the internal and external dimension of security, whose priorities alongside the fight against terrorism or hybrid threats would be migrant smuggling networks and other cross-border criminal groups. Researchers, producers, distributors and experts on security related goods benefit from this political mainstream.

1.2.1. EU policy on the single market, industry, entrepreneurship and small businesses

Under the French Commissioner Thierry Breton (former CEO of digital giant ATOS), DG GROW has as one of its priorities supporting the European security industry. It coordinates the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme 2014-2020, Horizon 2020, with nearly €80 billion of funding available. H2020 follows a cross-cutting approach that fosters public-private exchange and advisory partnerships between European decision-makers, industry, scientists, academics and civil society. The priority on social challenges includes the theme “Secure Societies” which covers border security research. It comprises land & sea control and surveillance, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), interoperability systems and improving the use of new technologies for border controls, Smart Borders, or security supply chain in EU customs policy and migrant smuggling.

The website for the H2020-Secure Societies program describes a threatening landscape of insecurity, assigning technology and innovation a first-rate strategic and economic value. It identifies as main challenges the reinforcement of border management security, cybersecurity, standardization and interoperability of systems or support for the Union’s external security policies, including the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The program has a total funding of €1,694.6 million. In this area, officials, politicians, lobbies, industry, academics and researchers meet, present and defend their latest products and services. Although H2020 is mainly civil-oriented, there are synergies with defence research as well as with other funds such as the Internal Security Fund (ISF).

Table 1
Morocco: the good pupil

For the EU, Morocco is a successful example of cooperation on migration. It is the Southern partner with the most developed relations. In 2013, they both signed an Association Agreement on Mobility that has been launched in 2019. Moreover, at the regional level, they dialogue in the Rabat Process and within the African Union. Without any doubt, Morocco is a great financial commitment for the EU, with a total of €342 million since 2013, of which almost €234 million come from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the remaining comes from other instruments such as the ENI (the European Neighbourhood Instrument) for integration programmes, or the National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA). This is without including the funding in the bilateral cooperation framework, with more than €1bn for equitable access to basic social services, democratic governance, state of law and mobility.

At the end of 2018, the UE approved, with insistence from the Spanish government, an aid of €140 million to reinforce the state’s border management capabilities. According to Statewatch, funding was granted through three projects, two of them funded through the North Africa window of the EUTF-Africa, focused on acquiring equipment for land and sea border surveillance to strengthen the security apparatus, therefore turning the blind eye to the human rights violations.

Later on, in December 2019, the Commission granted €389 million as part of its support to reforms, inclusive development and border management within the “Euro-Moroccan partnership for shared prosperity”. Furthermore, on the 11th of December of 2019, Morocco received €101.7 million of funds promised in 2018 to fight irregular migration and human trafficking.

Morocco effectively conditions border control knowing the importance of being the only land border with the EU. It reinforces or loosens migration control according to its internal interests and the support to its more sensitive political and strategic matters, such as the Western Sahara, fisheries agreements or human rights violations.

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23 With the Association Agreement in force since 2000, in 2008 an “advanced” status inside the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was granted to the country. Additionally, in 2013, a new action plan was adopted in the ENP framework and an EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership was launched. There are ongoing negotiations regarding visa facilitation and readmission, as well as a free trade agreement very broad in scope. Moreover, in 2014, a renewed agreement on fishery entered into force. According to two recent judgements of the European Court of Justice, The EU can enforce its agreements with Morocco without applying them to West Sahara.


25 1) Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region (BMP-Maghreb) funded through the EUTF-Africa to assist both Morocco and Tunisia in the reinforcement of their border management strategies (£30 million only for Morocco used for upgrading border management capacity, IT infrastructure for biometrics or border control equipment, drones included)
2) Support to the integrated management of borders and migration in Morocco (£40 from EUTF-Africa)
3) A new programme to support Morocco in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings (worth (£70 million)

26 https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/12/289449/eu-morocco-development-migration/
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1.2.2. Research and Innovation Policy

Bulgarian Commissioner Mariya Gabriel\textsuperscript{30} leads Research and Innovation policy through the Directorate General for Research and Innovation. DG RTD also coordinates Horizon 2020\textsuperscript{30} and will implement their powerful successor Horizon Europe\textsuperscript{31} for the next budget period 2021-2027.

According to the 2018 Commission's proposal for the future Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 –currently under negotiation and likely to be modified after the emergence of COVID19–, the EU will intensify its role as a security and defence provider with an allocation of at least \textit{€30.8 billion to migration and border control} (2.7% of the total budget and 207% more than the previous period), € 24.3 billion will go to security and defence (2.1% of the total), as well as a large part of the €100 billion for innovation and the digital economy.

Former European Commission Vice President Jyrki Katainen\textsuperscript{32}, said "for the first time in the history of the European Union, a part of the European budget is devoted to investing collectively to develop new technologies and equipment to protect our people". He was referring to the new \textit{European Defence Fund} (€13 billion, €4.1 billion of which will be devoted to defence research), which will boost "cross-border investments in state-of-the-art technology and equipment and fully interoperable in areas such as encrypted software and drone technology."

Also, in the 2018 proposal is also foreseen a new European Peace Facility (off-budget fund worth €10.5 billion that will draw together existing off-budget mechanisms devoted to security and defence) which should increase the effectiveness of CSDP military missions and operations finance.

Finally, for this period is proposed a Digital Europe Programme under the political co-leadership of Commissioners Thierry Breton and Margrethe Vestager, coordinated by the Directorate General for Communication Networks, Content

\textsuperscript{30} Mariya Gabriel: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/gabriel_en
\textsuperscript{30} Spain H2020 participation profile: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/dashboard/sense/app/a976d168-2023-41d8-a5ec-77649154726/sheet/0c8af38b-b73c-4
d2-ba41-fb3e33ab7acd/state/analysis/select/Country/Spain
and Technology (DG CONNECT) with a global budget of €9.2 billion. Digital Europe³³, will boost investments in supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, advanced digital skills and guarantee a wide use of digital technologies in the economy and society.

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1.3. Migration Control inside Europe and at the EU external borders

1.3.1. Security and Home Affairs

At the external borders and within the European territory, there is a indisputable pre-eminence of the Security and Home Affairs Policy on migration control related matters. The powerful Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs of the European Commission (DG HOME) is part of the Vice Presidency for Promoting (formerly Protection) our European Way of Life. Directed by the Commissioner for Home Affairs (Ylva Johansson), DG HOME is responsible for borders security, migration and asylum, and cooperation with third countries on these matters. Furthermore, it coordinates and supervises the JHA agencies (such as eu-Lisa, Frontex / EBCGA, EASO, Europol, Cepol or EMCDDA).

DG HOME overall budget for 2014-2020 was €10.52 billion. The 75% of these resources went to AMIF (33%) and ISF (41%) Funds and the other 25% went to JHA Agencies (EUR 2.36 billion).

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)

AMIF was created for MFF 2014-20, with a total budget of €3.137 million. It serves four specific objectives: 1) to strengthen and develop the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and its efficient/uniform application; 2) support legal migration and promote integration; 3) improve returns; and, 4) guarantee greater solidarity between the MS, helping those who have greater migratory pressure. Most of the AMIF (approximately 88%) is channelled through shared management with MS.

Internal Security Fund (ISF)

The ISF promotes the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the Union’s external borders. Its total budget amounts to €3.8 billion for 2014-2020 period. The FSI Fund is made up of two instruments:

- FSI Borders and visas
- FSI Police

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Other funds managed by DG HOME

- Since 2015, DG HOME\textsuperscript{36} has also managed the financing of security research and innovation activities, through the Horizon 2020 program on \textit{“social challenges”}. With a budget of about €1.7 billion until 2020, DG HOME manages the 75% of the budget, and DG CONECT the 25% left.

- The Europe for Citizens program aimed at promoting European citizenship and improving conditions for civic and democratic participation at EU level became part of the DG’s portfolio.

Since 2015, Spain\textsuperscript{37} has benefited from \textbf{€801.6 million from the European Union just for border and migration management}. This amount comes mainly from the AMIF (€460.8 million) and the Internal Security Fund-ISF (€340.8 million).

\textsuperscript{36}Funding Home Affairs: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing-fundings
1.3.2. Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion Policy

Finally, the policy that deals with 99% of migration, that is, legal migration and inclusion, is almost invisible in the current distribution of resources and political attention. The EU is home to 21.6 million migrants, 4.2%\(^{39}\) of the total EU population\(^{38}\). New immigrants who settle in the EU each year represent less than 0.5% of the EU population. Most may stay in the medium term, so job search and social inclusion is crucial.

This policy covers social support to housing, healthcare and schooling, access to employment and children/youth assistance. Although migration policies are a competence of Member States, the EU supports national programs and policies. NGOs and local authorities, as social services and migrant integration’s providers, can access various EU funds. The financing tools in this area from which Spain benefits are mainly:

- **AMIF:** which has allocated €427,413,936 to Spain, to improve employability, integration of vulnerable groups, prevention of xenophobia and strengthening ties between the state administration and civil society.

- **European Social Fund (ESF\(^{40}\)):** Spain is investing €2 billion to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 1.5 million by 2020, including immigrants as a target group.

- **ERASMUS +** dedicated to education and training.

- **European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)** to strengthen economic and social cohesion.

The **DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion** (DG EMPL) coordinates and supervises the policy of each country, promotes the exchange of good practices and coordinates the funding tools\(^{51}\) in this area. Social organizations and the private social sector, through subsidies and agreements, access this type of resources that the Spanish authorities, intermediaries and channelers of these funds, coordinate.

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\(^{38}\) Incluyendo migrantes económicos y sus allegados, solicitantes y beneficiarios de asilo y protección internacional; apátridas o personas con nacionalidad indeterminada.

\(^{39}\) Incluyendo migrantes económicos y sus allegados, solicitantes y beneficiarios de asilo y protección internacional; apátridas o personas con nacionalidad indeterminada.

\(^{40}\) FSE in Spain: https://ec.europa.eu/eef/main.jsp?catId=4788\&langId=en

\(^{41}\) DG EMPL Funding tools: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=86
2. KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS AND FUNDS FOR MIGRATION CONTROL IN SPAIN

Migration policy in Spain is an exclusive competence of the State according to Spanish Constitution (Art. 149.2). However, due to the decentralization of political power, there are policies and actions related to migration that fall on the regional (Comunidades autónomas) and municipal sphere.

At the Spanish national level, those who manage migration policy are basically the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration and the Ministry of Interior. But Foreign Affairs European Union and Cooperation Ministry also has a great weight in the management of human mobility.

Ministry of Interior: the prevalence of migration control and border shielding

The prevalence of migratory containment in Spanish national approach has to do fundamentally with three phenomena: 1) the transition of Spain in the last 30 years from being a migratory origin and transit country to a destination one, 2) the fact of being a Southern border by sea (Canary islands route and Mediterranean) and land (Ceuta and Melilla enclaves are the only land border between Europe and Africa) and finally, 3) as EU MS who has to implement EU border and migration policies.

Ministry of Interior competences: prosecution of irregular immigration, border control, Central Registry of Foreigners (including unaccompanied minors), control and coordination of Migrant Detention Centre (CIE); deportation, returns and repatriations, management of the Asylum and Refugee Office and supervision of compliance with EU regulations.

Emergency actions

- In 2018 they cost €12,022,673.45, of which €11,196,000 were funded by the AMIF and ISF funds. Among the actions included, acquisition of preventive detection system for public spaces or security vehicles for migrant transportation.

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43 http://www.interior.gob.es/es/documentos/542012/11725723/Acciones-de-Emergencias-EMAS/8a5d83b9-2b80-4a07-b0d5-20234f213223
In 2019, € 11,357,786 were allocated, of which the EU financed € 10,382,599. The actions consisted of: acquisition of 18 security vehicles for migrant transportation; establishment of three CATE (Centre of temporary attention for migrants) in Almería, Motril and Málaga, and services related to those centres, equipment to identify migrants under the European EURODAC system, among others.

The Secretary of State for Security made the following expenses:

- €10,039,900 in current and capital transfers (2014-2020) for migration assistance (such as Spanish Red Cross assistance programmes), for the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Network of Schengen Communications and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

- €55,393,260 (2014-2018) in long-term projects and investments, such as infrastructure for immigration, the SIVE system for external surveillance, costs derived from the Schengen area or the “Plan sur” program.

However, there are many other expenses of the Ministry of Interior that are not here included but also finance migration control (staff, personnel and supplies, equipment, citizen security, among others).

On international police cooperation (2014-2020), €404 million, distributed in the area of international cooperation (€97,198,410), of aid and subsidies in the scope of international police cooperation (€9,986,680) and new and replacement investment associated with the operational operation of services and investment of an immaterial nature (€296,959,450).

The Under-secretary of Interior, as manager of the Asylum and Refugee Office, spent for the same period €37 million.
2.2. Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migrations

Competences: CETI (Migrant Temporary Stay Centres), CAR\(^{46}\) (Refugee Reception centres); statistics, qualitative and quantitative information gathering on migratory movements; immigrant work and residence permits; humanitarian assistance programs for immigrants and intervention for exceptional situations; integration (management of state subsidies and collaboration with public and private entities); programs for the voluntary return of immigrants and family reunification; management of EU funds and action plans on asylum, migration and integration (AMIF).

The interannual expenses for 2014-2020 of the General Secretariat of Immigration and Emigration on migration related actions were €3,408,988,640.

The general State budget items "Actions in the field of migration" and "Aid and subsidies in favour of immigrants and refugees" are the most resourced over the last six years with €1,475,267,300, allocated to NGOs and civil society actors.

2.3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation

The MFA\(^{47}\) directs, among other matters, foreign and security policy, relations with the EU, multilateral relations, development cooperation policy, bilateral relations with other states, including those of migratory interest, such as Morocco. Spain as a member of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and sovereign state has the exclusive responsibility of migration and alien policies, develops its bilateral migration outsourcing agenda, both on the western Mediterranean route (especially Morocco) and on the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands.

International development cooperation is mainly managed by the Spanish International Cooperation and Development Agency (AECID\(^{48}\)), although public funds allocated to it (Official Development Assistance, ODA) may also come from other ministries and administrations. Spain channels this aid directly to public or private institutions in the countries or indirectly through NGO and international organizations.

In direct bilateral aid, once the funds reach the partner country's agency, they are managed according to the country's procedures, which may include public

\(^{46}\) http://extranjeros.mitramiss.gob.es/es/ProteccionAsilo/car/index.html
\(^{48}\) Spanish International Cooperation and Development Agency (AECID): https://www.aecid.es/EN/aecid/structure
tenders. Another option of executing the projects is through the so-called “aid in kind”, by which the manager of the funds directly supplies the partner country with a specific good or service, instead of disbursing the economic amount for the country to acquire that good or service.

Spain has three entities accredited by the European Commission (DG DEVCO), to receive and manage European funds:

- **AECID**, which is also the focal point of the Spanish Administration for the negotiation and management of the EUTF-Africa
- **FIAPP**: International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies
- and **COFIDES** (Spanish Development Financing Company)

are the three Spanish entities The funds delegated by the EU are transferred to their budgets and are executed following Spanish regulations and the procedures of each institution.

**Other ministries with responsibilities in migration related matters**

**Ministry of Finance:** in addition to prepare and manage the General State Budgets (PGE), the State Secretariat for Budgets and Expenses, is in charge of planning and managing community funds and monitoring and managing Spanish participation in the EU community budget (through the Directorate General of European Funds).

**Ministry of Defense:** joint military intelligence, surveillance systems; surveillance and security of sovereign maritime areas; security, control and air police operations.

**Ministry of Transport, Mobility and Urban Agenda:** control of State Ports and Port Authorities and maritime rescue. Collaborate with the Ministry of Defense on safety at sea. From 2014 to 2019, the government has allocated €865,890,000 to the Maritime Safety and Rescue Society (SASEMAR).

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40 FIAPP: [https://www.fiapp.org/en/acerca-de-fiapp-main/](https://www.fiapp.org/en/acerca-de-fiapp-main/)

50 Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima also known as SASEMAR or Salvamento Marítimo is the Spanish sea search and rescue agency in charge of maritime traffic control, safety and rescue operations, as well as protection of the maritime environment. It has no law enforcement responsibilities. [http://www.salvamientomaritimo.es/#quedate-en-casa](http://www.salvamientomaritimo.es/#quedate-en-casa)
Ministry of Science and Innovation: public research and innovation organizations and activities in the field of security.

The Ministry of Social Rights and the 2030 Agenda: responsible for actions and subsidies for the fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda. Just created, this Ministry doesn’t have its own migration-related budget.

Ministry of Labor and Social Economy: manages the European Social Fund (ESF) in Spain and may have implications for irregular labor inspection.

2.5. European funds of shared management with Spain

The most important European Funds are the AMIF and the ISF (ISF-Police and the ISF-Borders and Visas), most of which follow the shared management procedure (Annex 1), through the National Programs (NP) for each fund:

- AMIF (€ 427,413,936): Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migrations and Ministry of Interior jointly propose the 2014-2020 MFF program. According to the AMIF National Programme Spain, the AMIF expenditure distribution is: 28,74% for asylum, 42,66% for return (includes forced return) and 28,60% for integration and illegal immigration.


In addition, and upon request from MS, a portion of these funds may be allocated in the short term for emergency assistance. Spain requested them as the EU Southern border, for the opening of new local registration centers, reinforcements for the Guardia Civil and Police, or provisioning for newly arrived immigrants.

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51 For more details on the organizational chart of the ministerial departments: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K6KDshkTC-oJlakAyVHlt6KgS2Gn8KbKqSHBmS67ahKv0A/edit.


AMIF beneficiaries may be the Interior or the Inclusion, Social Security and Migration ministries, public migrant centers (CETI, CAR, CIE); NGO; local and regional public entities; and, public and private organizations. Those of the ISF are usually the Subdirectorate-General for Information and Communications Systems for Security, the Civil Guard, the Police or the Undersecretariat of the Ministry of the Interior; public authorities such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the coast guard, port authorities or the armed forces; state and regional authorities; local public bodies; NGO; private and public law companies; and, educational and research organizations ..

The EU budget is organized through Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs) of seven years. The present MFF for 2014-2020 is finalized and the following (2021-2027) is being negotiated in Brussels (with delay due to the Covid19 scenario and the change of priorities regarding the proposal presented by the Commission in 2018). Each year has its annual budget divided into sections. Section III corresponds to the European Commission. The 2019 annual budget contains Titles and headings clearly related to migration containment.

How are funds managed?

There are three methods of budget implementation applying to the EU general budget:

1) **Shared management** with Member States (MS). The funding is earmarked to a specific geographic area and as agreed in the National Programmes (NP). MS designate bodies to be responsible for the management and control of Union funds (public bodies, NGOs, international organisations, private companies, education and research organisations etc). An example of shared management is the AMIF and ISF funds.

2) **Direct Management**: The budget is implemented via Commission personnel and services, including EU delegations under the authority of the EU Heads of Delegations in the MSs. The European Commission or European Agencies grant it through financial instruments, grants, procurements or through Trust Funds (e.g. EUTF- Africa or Madad Fund).

3) **Indirect management**: The Commission entrusts the implementation of the EU budget through financial collaboration agreements (with third countries, European or international agencies, European bodies, public law bodies of MS, bodies governed by private law with a public service mission or by public-private partnerships). This kind of management

For more information see: [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K6KDvkTc-oJkakAyVHU6NQQ2mr0bKzKHbmsB7shKo2A/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K6KDvkTc-oJkakAyVHU6NQQ2mr0bKzKHbmsB7shKo2A/edit)

### Table: Autonomous Communities

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>4,250,090</td>
<td>2,588,349</td>
<td>2,764,143</td>
<td>3,257,191</td>
<td>4,917,755</td>
<td>5,462,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cataluña</td>
<td>9,065,533</td>
<td>9,065,264</td>
<td>9,065,264</td>
<td>9,113,720</td>
<td>9,113,720</td>
<td>9,917,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Madrid</td>
<td>5,410,794</td>
<td>5,950,745</td>
<td>4,466,804</td>
<td>4,881,644</td>
<td>4,956,854</td>
<td>4,677,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 1
EU BUDGET MANAGEMENT MODES\textsuperscript{54}

The EU budget is organized through \textit{Multiannual Financial Frameworks} (MFFs) of seven years. The present MFF for 2014-2020 is finalized and the following (2021-2027) is being negotiated in Brussels (with delay due to the Covid19 scenario and the change of priorities regarding the proposal presented by the Commission in 2018). Each year has its annual budget divided into sections. Section III corresponds to the European Commission. The 2019 annual budget\textsuperscript{55} contains Titles and headings clearly related to migration containment.

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3) \textbf{Indirect management}: The Commission entrusts the implementation of the EU budget through financial collaboration agreements (with third countries, European or international agencies, European bodies, public law bodies of MS, bodies governed by private law with a public service mission or by public-private partnerships). This kind of management

\textsuperscript{54} Commission website: Different EU Funding management modes: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/how-eu-funding-works/management-eu-funding_en
\textsuperscript{57} Direct management instruments are financial instruments, grants, procurements and Union Trust Funds for external action

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makes it difficult to track the funds received, as the beneficiaries may compute the granted EU funds as part of their own budget. An example is contributions to international organizations and European Agencies.

European funding can be long-term through National Programmes (NP) agreed with the Commission, or short-term, as in the case of emergency assistance, which will be granted to the authorities nominated by the affected MS. For example, in the case of Spain, € 26.4 million have been granted in emergency assistance under the AMIF and the IFS since 2015.

The majority of the funds – AMIF 56- and ISF- are granted to the MS national authorities at the beginning of every budget period (2014-2020). National authorities then manage and implement the budget through national programmes agreed with the Commission. Since 2015, Spain has been granted € 749.4 million, of which € 352.9 million have been disbursed.

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ANNEX 2
FRONTEX: from a Member States’ technical tool to a migration control leader

The expansion of the European decentralized agencies of the Justice and Home Affairs Area (Europol\(^69\), Eurojust\(^60\), Frontex\(^61\), FRA\(^62\), EASO\(^63\) o eu-Lisa\(^64\)) is linked not only to their greater flexibility, but also to their adaptability to new technologies and emerging problems in an area dynamic and changing like security. Operational since 2005, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA), better known as Frontex, was born as other decentralized agencies, to serve as technical and specialized MS support. After the last revision of its mandate in 2019\(^65\), Frontex has not only multiplied its budget, but it has gone from being an institutional tool at the service of MS to being an actor that acquires its own equipment, coordinates joint operations, executes returns, signs agreements with third countries or recruit a body of 10,000 armed border guards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(^66)</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>Total (^67)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original 2013 programming (€M)</td>
<td>80,9</td>
<td>86,1</td>
<td>88,7</td>
<td>91,2</td>
<td>91,2</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>94,9</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Frontex budget (€M)</td>
<td>94,0</td>
<td>143,0</td>
<td>254,0</td>
<td>302,0</td>
<td>320,0</td>
<td>333,0</td>
<td>345,0</td>
<td>1,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{69}\) Europol: https://www.europol.europa.eu/es/about-europol

\(^{60}\) Eurojust: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eurojust_es

\(^{61}\) EBCGA/ Frontex: https://frontex.europa.eu/es/

\(^{62}\) FRA: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/fra_es

\(^{63}\) EASO: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/B20213822ESC.pdf

\(^{64}\) eu-LISA: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/eu-lisa_es


Para el próximo periodo presupuestario 2021-2027, la Comisión en su propuesta de 2018 propone cuadruplicar la cantidad del periodo anterior: llegar a más de €21,3 mil millones frente a los €5,6 mil millones previstos para 2014-2020. En la propuesta se incluye la creación de un nuevo Fondo de gestión integrada de fronteras dotado con €9,300 millones and to allocate more than €12.000 million for the agencies descentralizadas that apoyan a los EM in the protección de fronteras como Frontex y EU-LISA.
For the next long-term EU budget 2021-2027, the Commission is proposing an EU budget for the management of external borders that will even quadruple the amount for the current period: reaching more than €21.3 billion, in comparison to €5.6 billion for 2014-2020. The proposal includes to create: a new Integrated Border Management Fund worth €9.3 billion and to allocate more than €12 billion for the decentralised agencies supporting MS protecting the borders: the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and EU-LISA.

At each stage of its institutional strengthening, Frontex has been increasingly closer to the private sector, while it has grown in operational and executive capacities, becoming the solution and remedy for all issues and competences related to border and immigration control. In this evolution, we can see that:

**Frontex is a VIP client of ICM**

Frontex is an intensive user of ICM services and finances the industry by buying and renting its own equipment alone or in co-ownership with EM.

- **In Joint Operations (JO),** the agency coordinates the deployment of specially trained staff and technical equipment (aircraft, vessels, and border control/ surveillance equipment) to external border areas in need of additional assistance. In Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations, Frontex is obliged to provide technical and operational assistance to MS and third countries. In 2018, the estimated operational budget for JOs with Spain was €20,439,161. In particular €1,278,814 for JO Hera (in western Mediterranean), € 18,169,390 for JO Indalo (Strait of Gibraltar) and € 990,957 for JO Minerva (between the Canary Islands and the West African coast).

- **As regards returns,** Frontex not only supports MS, but the agency directly coordinates and executes forced return operations (including border identity checks, authorization and refusal of entry, document management and coordination with consular authorities, planning and logistics commercial flights, etc.) becoming a “deportation machine”. Between 2009 and 2019, it returned 60,135 people in 1,437 operations according to El Orden Mundial. From November 2019 to 2021, the joint venture formed by Air Europa, Aeronova and Swiftair,

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69 Frontex deportation machine: https://player.vimeo.com/video/351673775

70 https://elordenmundial.com/mapas/deportaciones-de-frontex/

71 In May 2018, the Ministry of the Interior awarded 9.9 million euros for the deportation flights of foreigners including transfers under the umbrella of FRONTEX, for a period of 18 months: Article Bolsamania of 22 March 2018: https://www.bolsamania.com/noticias/empresas/economia--la-ute-europa-aeronoa-y-swiftair-se-adjudica-por-99-millones-los-vuelos-de-deportacion-de-inmigrantes--3308468.html
has been awarded these flights. Joint Return Operations (JRO) with Frontex are cheaper than those organized by each MS.

- **Frontex recruits, equips, trains and funds a permanent body of border guards made up of 10,000 armed officers** to be deployed at external borders and in third countries. Under the 2018 Commission proposal for the next 2021-2027 budget framework, Frontex will acquire its own equipment (boats, planes and vehicles, among others) available to be deployed at any time and for all necessary operations. For this, the Commission will allocate € 2.2 billion for acquisitions, maintenance and operation of air, maritime and land assets.

- Regarding **drones** (see Statewatch analysis), Frontex is in fact replacing its sea rescue capabilities by aerial surveillance through high-resistance drones developed by military technology (MALE-Medium Altitude Long Endurance). Frontex published a tender for €50 million euros for two years (extendable twice for one year at a time) to fly over the airspace of Malta, Italy or Greece with Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) that could start as early as spring 2020.

**Frontex boost networks and connections with the Migration Control Industry**

To test potential solutions and evaluate their capabilities, and also to identify future needs, Frontex organizes events and tests/ promotes products, previously presented by the industry, who has continuous contacts and open doors. In all these spaces, meetings and conferences, companies and their lobbyists, especially the European Organization for Security / EOS (see document on lobbying), are among the attendees, as speakers or even as organizers or hosts. For example: in December 2019, FRONTEX convened a Industry Dialogue FOR for procurement of handguns, ammunition and holsters for the standing corps of the European Border and Coast Guard.

In the matter of research, **Frontex advises the European Commission (DG HOME) on the lines and activities of investigation related to border security.** According to a recent memorandum of understanding, Frontex will

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72 Germany, for example, deported half of its irregular immigrants through JRO along with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Spain deported 8% through JRO (report)


77 From February 2020, Frontex will also advise the Commission in the area of border security research and innovation, which implies that the agency will evaluate the results of research and innovation and will actively participate in the Horizon 2020 programs (with an indicative budget of 118 million euros for 2018-2020) and its powerful heir Europe

identify capacity gaps in the areas of surveillance, analysis, biometrics, cyber security, and the availability and exchange of information on border matters. It decides the solutions to investigate, facilitates its tests, supervises the investigations, delimits what are the national and Agency operational needs and will even disseminate the successful results, for their application to the market. Frontex studies the availability of technology for integrated border management and, in cooperation with Member States, industry and internal stakeholders, makes recommendations for introducing these solutions on the ground.

The industry has open access to Frontex

Industry actors can visit and inform Frontex experts about their products and services only by submitting an application form. The proposals will be selected by Frontex taking into account the novelty and potential impact of the company’s products and services for the border guard community. On Linkedin, Frontex in its institutional advertising section #didyouknow describes as one of its main tasks to identify the technologies that can be used for border control.

Frontex promotes and generates business opportunities for the industry

Frontex carries out vulnerability assessments\(^{79}\) on MS capacity to manage their borders according to MS technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure and adequately skilled and trained staff necessary for border control. These reports issue binding recommendations on the material to be acquired, modernized, or disposed of. This means decisions about thousands of border patrol vehicles, hundreds of helicopters, planes, boats, surveillance systems, infrastructure improvements, etc.

Through its growing externalization agenda, Frontex is present in third countries (deploys personnel beyond external borders through the Liaison Officer Network\(^{80}\)) and grants to third countries, especially in Africa, to monitor and protect borders. Based on cooperation agreements, Third countries are offered more favorable trade relations. As explained above, migration control has been integrating and even conditioning cooperation for the development of origin and transit migration countries. In this context, the military and security industry provides human resources, training and equipment in latent or open conflict areas, where the legal requirements are little or not at all guaranteed.

\(^{79}\) Frontex Vulnerability assessments: https://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/vulnerability-assessment/
\(^{80}\) Ver Liaison Officers Network: https://frontex.europa.eu/partners/liaison-officers-network/
Frontex feeds the securitarian narrative favoring the Migration Control Industry

- There is a growing incompatibility between humanitarian principles that feeds Frontex institutional communication and the immigration containment policy that it executes. Their security language seems aimed only at protecting European citizens. Migrants are invisible, there is hardly any practical or statistical consideration of deaths, disaggregated data or information that personalizes migrants. Example of institutional communication on social networks: Linkedin post June 21, 2020: "What a flight! Once again, we managed to bring our officers to #Frontex operations in Greece and Albania, and others – back home. (...) To new officers who come to participate in our operations, welcome! For those who returned home after their homework, where they helped keep Europe safe and secure, thank you and take a little rest." The post seems to refer to soldiers returning from the war front, not a mention of their mission to safeguard human rights or the mere existence of migrants.

- There is also a progressive inhibition of the agency in search and rescue operations, which are progressively replaced by unmanned aerial observation missions by means of drones. This practice implies the breach of the minimum humanitarian obligations to which the law of the Sea obliges. In addition, the location of the detected boats is communicated to the Libyan coast guard, instead of informing rescue NGOs, which implies leaving them at the mercy of the mafias or militia forces without any guarantee of protection.

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**Frontex and opacity**

Frontex uses the security exception to deny access to information and strongly defends this privilege. The activists and researchers of Corporate European Observatory, Luisa Izuzquiza and Arne Semsrott\(^2\) managed to seat Frontex on the bench of the Court of Justice of the European Union for breach of their obligation of transparency, but the judgment dismissed the lawsuit and ordered them to pay exorbitant proceeding costs.(€ 23,700).

See also European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Statewatch\(^3\) analysis on lack of transparency in Operation Hera (West Africa-Canary Islands sea route)


ANNEX 3
Written answer of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to information request by Fundación porCausa (June 30, 2020)\textsuperscript{84}

Question by porCausa: Spain transferred €40 million to the Moroccan Government within the framework of cooperation in migration matters and reinforcement of the fight against irregular immigration by Morocco. For what reason was that money transferred through the International Foundation and for Ibero-America (FIIAPP)?

MFA Ministry answer:
The FIIAPP is, together with AECID, one of the Spanish entities accredited by the European Union to execute delegated funds.

The project to which the question refers is an action awarded to the FIIAPP in December 2018: “Support for the integrated management of borders and migration in Morocco”, within the framework of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for the Stability and Response to the root causes of irregular migration and displacement of people in Africa (TFUE).

The total amount amounts to € 44M and aims to strengthen Moroccan capacities to manage their borders and ensure the protection of vulnerable migrants, in accordance with international human rights standards.

The TFUE for Africa approves projects in each operational committee of different characteristics, some of which transcend the field of development cooperation. The FIIAPP, due to the breadth of its mandate and its ability to mobilize human and material resources, is the most suitable Spanish institution to execute this project in Morocco.

Q. Are there links between Spain's investment in cooperation through AECID and the efforts of the Spanish government to prevent the arrival of immigrants? If so, what are those linkages?

A: Migration policy and development cooperation policy have clearly differentiated objectives. While the former have as their objective the regulation of immigration, cooperation policies have as their objective the fight against poverty and inequalities, but also other objectives such as

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\textsuperscript{84} The original answer was in Spanish
institutional strengthening and respect and promotion of human rights. Development cooperation seeks to improve the living conditions of the population, regardless of whether or not they are in a migratory context.

The actions of the Spanish Cooperation in countries that are in this situation do not have the objective of stopping the migration movements. Spain is opposed to conditioning ODA on immigration collaboration.

On the other hand, the V Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation provides for the training of institutions with the aim of promoting that the migration and mobility of people take place in an orderly, safe, regular and responsible manner, applying a rights-based approach human and human security. Spain has signed (or is in the process of signing) cooperation agreements with 33 partner countries, either Country Association Frameworks or Advanced Cooperation Agreements.

The conclusion of these agreements is not determined by their immigration status. Some of the States with which Spain has signed cooperation agreements with countries of origin or transit of irregular immigrants to Spain. Notwithstanding, the actions carried out by the Spanish Cooperation in these countries do not have the objective of stopping migration, but rather of reducing poverty and inequality, among others, no matter how much these inequalities may be among the so-called "root causes" of migrations. In Africa, Spain has signed cooperation agreements with a number of countries, which are origin, transit and migratory destination, such as Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Cape Verde, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia.

Cooperation in the field of migration and development in West Africa, Sahel and North Africa has developed in recent years primarily through collaboration with the EU within the framework of the EU Emergency Trust Fund (TFEU) for stability and to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa.

Some of the 13 projects (for a total amount of € 185.5 M) awarded to Spain and, specifically, to AECID, under the TFEU (in countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania) are linked to development objectives, such as strengthening resilience, rural development or the generation of employment and opportunities in women and youth, who are potential migrant groups. Instead, other projects focus on institutional strengthening in countries that are of origin, destination and migratory transit, in order to contribute to the improvement of public policies for the proper management of migration. AECID has already worked specifically in this field within the framework of the Spain-ECOWAS Fund for Migration and Development Spain-ECOWAS created in 2006, and some of the projects awarded by the Trust Fund (in Morocco, Egypt, Senegal and Mali) have in common this objective of reinforcing the migration management and governance, including raising public awareness and promoting the participation of migrants in economic and social development in Senegal.
Furthermore, the human rights approach is especially relevant in those countries that, like Morocco, are origin, transit and migratory destination. Spanish cooperation encourages the development of a narrative and appropriate awareness-raising policies that transmit the beneficial effects of migration to the population and influence the prevention and fight against racism and xenophobia against migrants. This is the case of the TFEU project in Morocco "Living together without discrimination".

3.- Several studies point out that cooperation and development aid strengthens the appearance of middle classes in low-income countries, these middle classes being the most likely to migrate to another country. What role plays this fact in designing your cooperation policies with migratory origin countries such as Senegal or Mali?

As said before, the actions of the Spanish Cooperation in countries that are in a migratory context, whether they are sending, receiving or transit countries, do not have the objective of stopping migratory movements, but rather to facilitate improvement of the living conditions of populations living in more disadvantaged countries, contributing to the achievement of the SDGs and to eradicating poverty, building the resilience of people and communities, reducing inequalities and promoting inclusive economic growth and the creation of more societies Cohesive and equitable, defending human rights and fundamental freedoms and promoting the conservation of the planet and the fight against climate change.

As people's living conditions improve in all these areas, it is possible that there may be repercussions in the need and motivations of the people of these countries to bandon their place of origin and seek better livelihoods. However, it does not seem that the causal relationship between these events is direct, but is influenced by multiple factors, some of them not directly related to poverty or inequality.

On the other hand, it should be added that the partner countries of Spanish Cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa they are at the bottom of the HDI report (Niger is last on the list, Mozambique and Mali are in the bottom 10, and Senegal, although somewhat better, is ranked 166 out of 189 countries in the 2019 report. ). The development of these countries (and, consequently, the reduction of their degree of poverty) is highly dependent on the physical environment and their population, both in rural and urban areas, is characterized by great vulnerability.

Along with this, the fragility of institutions, together with the severity of internal conflicts and combined with the highest population growth on the planet, make up a scenario of continuous crises that need to be addressed. In this context, which can be aggravated in the post-Covid stage, the cooperation framework of Spain with these countries is characteristic for PMA, very respectful and aligned with the priorities of local institutions and based on the added value that the Cooperation Spanish can contribute in
Migration Control Industry 1: ¿Who are the paymasters?

basic services such as health, rural development and food security and in institutional strengthening and support for public policies.

Thus, the creation of employment for youth in agriculture and livestock is one of the priority lines of Spanish Cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel, so that rural development is a generator of employment and greater productivity, accompanying the passage of economies of self-consumption to economies of commercialization and even export of agricultural production.

Although the priority sectors are not exactly coincident in all countries, the three development results foreseen in the 2019-2023 Country Association Framework (MAP) with Senegal are, in this sense, a good example of the objectives of the Spanish Cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa:

- Support for productive development, with the aim of influencing the increase in the income of producers in the agricultural sector.

- Strengthening resilience through improving access to food, health services, and drinking water and sanitation, with attention to children and women.

- Supporting the effectiveness of services of public institutions with a territorial focus, so that respond to the real needs of the population.
Migration Control Industry (MCI) is an investigation by Fundación porCausa

which aims to reveal who benefits from anti-migration policies and how much money they cost. This work gives continuity to the work we started in 2017 and is licensed under a Creative Commons BY license (you can use and spread it freely; just please quote porCausa).

This research has two main components: on the one hand, it is part of an exhaustive study of the European mechanisms involved in the design of Community migration policies. The team in charge of this area was coordinated by researcher Ana González-Páramo and managed to reveal the complex ecosystem of European institutions, agencies and bodies involved in financing migration control companies. The second branch of this research, coordinated by the journalist José Bautista, delves into the Spanish case, based on a series of interviews with relevant sources in the migration business, and using an extensive database that compiles in detail and analyses 1,677 public contracts* (taken from open sources) totalling more than 660 million euros, which were awarded by the Spanish government between 2014 and 2019, in accordance with the financial framework of the European Union. The journalistic aspect of this investigation also pays attention to the phenomenon of “revolving doors” and reveals more than 120 former senior government officials who were hired by MCI multinationals.

Over the course of a year, this investigation has faced major obstacles in obtaining information of general interest. The main hurdles were concentrated in obtaining public contracts which, according to the Transparency Law and European legislation on access to public information, should be fully accessible to the public. In this sense, Fundación porCausa is awaiting numerous resolutions from the Transparency Portal. Due to the opacity surrounding the management of public money and the securitarian nature of the anti-migratory business, the porCausa database (open and free) only reflects those contracts that the Spanish Government made public, and which represent only a part of all European spending and the general state budget in the MCI. Public contracts classified as “confidential” for reasons of national security, as well as subsidies, civil servants’ salaries in the service of the MCI and other expenses incurred with public money, are not included in this database.

This research is the result of the collective work of the network of journalists and researchers who collaborate in porCausa. Over the course of a year, the following have participated in Industria del Control Migratorio: Alberto Alonso, Lorena Alonso, José Bautista, Sheyla Bermúdez, Álvaro Bravo, Macarena Decado, Julio Díez, Gonzalo Fanjul, Pablo Fernández, Sabela González, Ana González-Páramo, Fermín Grodina, Alessandra Guida, Marta Maroto, Arturo Martín, Emilia G. Morales, Diana Moreno, Sara Ortega, Santiago Pedrazzoli, Lucila Rodríguez-Alarcón, Joseba Torronteras and Enric Vall.

porCausa needs you to keep on investigating migrations like nobody does.

They’re small. Make them great.